Job creation, job destruction, labour mobility and wages in Poland, 1988–1998 1 by Jackson, John E. & Mach, Bogdan W.
Job creation, job destruction,
labour mobility and wages
in Poland, 1988–19981
John E. Jackson* and Bogdan W. Mach**
*Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.
E-mail: jjacksn@umich.edu
**Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland.
E-mail: bmach@isppan.waw.pl
Abstract
Longitudinal data from interviews with Poles of working age conducted in 1988,
1993 and 1998 combined with longitudinal firm-level data present a detailed view
of the transition from a state-dominated to a market economy. Job losses in state
firms and job creation in new private firms are the dominant employment
changes, other than retirements from the labour force. In the Polish case, a signifi-
cant proportion of this movement over the 1988–1998 period involves a spell of
unemployment or exit from the labour force before obtaining a private sector job.
This results in considerable job competition between workers leaving the state
sector and those who are out of the labour force or unemployed. Income differ-
ences between the state sector and the de novo sector appear to have little associa-
tion with mobility. These results suggest that movement to the new private
sector is more likely to be the result of job loss than the result of people looking
for better, higher paying jobs. Self-employment plays an important role in the
development of the private sector. People working on their own account have
higher incomes than wageworkers and are likely to become owners employing
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additional workers. Incomes are higher in regions with high rates of job creation
and depressed in regions with job destruction.
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1. Introduction
It is now widely recognized that labour market mobility is an important contribu-
tor to economic growth as workers move from lower to higher productivity jobs.
This often means moving from older declining firms, industries and sectors to
newly created and expanding firms. The transition economies in East-Central
Europe continue to provide important evidence about labour market mobility
and how it contributes to, and is affected by, job creation and destruction. We
first review some of the theoretical and empirical literature on transition econom-
ics and labour mobility. We then analyse longitudinal data on Polish workers col-
lected before and during the Polish transition to test propositions found in this
literature. Some of these propositions concern changes in the employment and
incomes of individual workers, which makes longitudinal data a necessary source
of information. The data and analysis corroborate some existing findings on job
mobility, but we develop several new propositions as well. One of these new
thrusts concerns the relationship between rates of regional job creation and job
destruction and changes in incomes and employment, which we study by incor-
porating information on local labour markets into models of job and income
change. Another proposition, based on the finding that the self-employed have
incomes that match or exceed those of wageworkers, posits that the self-
employed are very likely to be or to become employers rather than just own-
account workers. We conclude with some observations comparing the Polish
evidence with that of studies in other transitional economies.
2. Theory and evidence on labour markets during the transition
in East-Central Europe
The processes of job destruction, job creation and labour mobility are inextricably
connected. Schumpeter’s description of economic development depends heavily
on the creation of new firms and, by implication, on workers moving from older
and declining firms to these newer ones. Caballero and Hammour (1996a,b) pres-
ent a formal model of this process and comment specifically on the rates and tim-
ing of destruction, creation and unemployment. An important feature stressed in
their model is the Schumpeterian argument that productivity in the new private
sector will be higher than that in the sclerotic older sector. As resources are
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reallocated to the new sector, this higher productivity will be reflected in
increased aggregate growth rates and ultimately in higher wages for the workers
in this sector.
Caballero and Hammour (1996b, footnote 1) suggest that their model may not
apply to the transitions from a state to a private economy but their propositions are
directly mirrored in the formal models of transition developed for East-Central Eur-
ope. (See Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Castanheira and Roland, 2000; Dewatripont
and Roland, 1994; Fidrmuc, 1998, 2000a,b; Rodrik, 1995; Roland, 1992, 2000.) These
models’ central idea, as in Caballero and Hammour, is about how fast job destruc-
tion in the state sector should proceed. The presumption is that destruction can be
controlled by the government, will precede creation and will lead to periods of high
unemployment. Too slow a rate of destruction means resources remain in the less
or unproductive sector too long, inhibiting growth and maintaining the status quo.
Too rapid a collapse of the outmoded state sector and too slow a rate of job creation
in the new sectors leads to unemployment, to workers leaving the labour force
and/or to self-employment as a default (Caballero and Hammour, 1996b, p. 162).
This under- and unemployment has both economic and political costs, as it reduces
output and capital accumulation, imposes costs on the public budget to provide
security payments and fosters opposition to the reforms and the governments that
pursue them. From these considerations, one hopes to deduce the optimal speed of
transition and presumably a desired trajectory for unemployment.
The unemployment featured in these models has important implications for
labour mobility and wages during the transition. The under- and unemployed
compete for jobs in the private sector with workers in state firms who might be
attracted to the private sector because of expected wage gains, work opportuni-
ties or from fear of unemployment. The competition from the under- and unem-
ployed reduces job-to-job movements and depresses wages for those who do find
employment. Thus, at least in the short run, wages may not be higher in the new
private sector even if productivity is higher. Tichit (2006) developed a model of
transition in which long-run development is aided by this short-run depression
of wages. Jackson (2003) made the same point with a computational model of
transition, although his main emphasis was on the political implications of the
timing of the job creation and destruction processes.
Schumpeterian models and Catallero and Hammour (1996a,b) presume that
job creation will take place in de novo firms that form to replace the declining
enterprises. The transition models applied in East-Central Europe, however, are
generally silent on this question. At times authors seem to imply that the private
sector job creation will occur among privatized and restructured former state
firms. Certainly, the more policy-oriented literature at the time made this
assumption, with a stronger emphasis on privatization than on entrepreneurship.
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990, are typical; an important exception is Murrell, 1992.)
Caballero and Hammour’s reference to self-employment as underemployment
or secondary work, following much of the earlier development literature, misses
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a potentially important aspect of the job creation process. Some proportion of
self-employment in East-Central Europe will be as just described. But other self-
employed individuals are or become entrepreneurs. (See Earle and Sakova, 2000;
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2002; Maloney, 2004; Slomczynski and Osborn, 2005
for discussion and evidence.) Their role, far from being undesirable, both individ-
ually and socially, may be valuable on both counts. As early entrepreneurs they
may be responsible for important amounts of the job creation and capital accu-
mulation assumed in the formal models.
The empirical work on transitional economies shows several countries that
resemble the models discussed and one that does not. The Polish transition is
described by Jackson et al. (1995, 1999, 2005) and Konings et al. (1996) using firm-
level longitudinal data from 1990 to 1997 and for the early 1990s, respectively.
These studies document the rapid and early decline of state enterprise employ-
ment, the unemployment rate of nearly 17 percent in the early 1990s and the sub-
sequent growth of employment in de novo firms, in accordance with the
theoretical models.
Estonia’s transition also fits this pattern. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002)
and Jurajda and Terrell (2001, 2003) analyse individual employment data and
report two important features of that country’s transition that are similar to
Poland’s and thus to the theoretical models. First, destruction preceded creation
by several years, leading to a period of high unemployment. Haltiwanger and
Vodopivec (2002, table 2, p. 609) report that 47 percent of those leaving a job
report doing so for involuntary reasons. Secondly, virtually all the job creation
was from de novo enterprises and not in restructured older firms. Haltiwanger
and Vodopivec (2002, p. 617) report that ‘job creation by owners and self-
employed workers surged’.2 They also find a subsequent increase in job destruc-
tion among owners, which they attribute to firm failure. They also report low
separation and destruction rates among the self-employed.
Jurajda and Terrell (2001, 2003) and Sorm and Terrell (1999) report a different
transition pattern for the Czech Republic. These studies also show that most job
creation was by de novo firms and not by older firms, whether privatized or not
(though most were). The Czech transition, in contrast to Poland’s and Estonia’s,
involved a high level of job-to-job mobility directly from the state to the private
sector, avoiding the period of high unemployment. The difference in mobility
patterns can be related to the different transition policies in each country. The
Czech Republic effectively continued soft budget constraints through the banking
system for the privatized enterprises. These hidden subsidies forestalled the large
and early job destruction seen in Estonia and Poland. The Czech job-to-job move-
ment, however, decreased substantially after 1996 when subsidies were tightened
and there was aggregate economic decline. These studies make it clear that the
Czech case does not fit the pattern predicted by the formal models.
2 Owners are distinguished from the self-employed based on whether they employ other workers.
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The formal models discussed above assume a homogenous workforce and
compatibility between the newly created jobs and the skills of workers in the old
jobs, allowing for job shifts once there is sufficient job creation. A second set of
propositions treats the labour force as more heterogeneous and discusses which
workers are more likely to make a transition and how wages are likely to change
as a result. Diewald and Mach (2006), Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000), Neal
(1995) and Newell and Socha (1998) all propose that the transition will change
the value of different forms of human capital. The more general the capital
acquired in the state sector the greater its value in the new private sector and the
more specific the capital acquired, the less its value. There will be increasing
returns in the form of higher wages to education and possibly managerial experi-
ence but decreasing returns to firm and job tenure, with overall work experience
falling somewhere in between. The analysis of individuals’ mobility adds infor-
mation about the formal models’ predictions. If education or other attributes have
higher earnings in the private sector these attributes should be associated with an
increased probability of moving from state to private firms if mobility is moti-
vated by job attractiveness rather than job destruction.
The data on individuals’ transitions necessary to explore these propositions
are sparser than the evidence on job destruction and job creation. The evi-
dence, though, is quite consistent and very much in line with the theoretical
propositions. (See Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Diewald and Mach, 2006; Lehmann
and Wadsworth, 2000; Newell and Socha, 1998; Sorm and Terrell, 1999.) Job
separations decreased with tenure, age and education and were higher for
women. In terms of wages, returns to education increased whereas returns to
more specific forms of human capital, as measured by job and firm tenure,
decreased. Newell and Socha (1998), however, find that these increased educa-
tional returns in the private sector were limited to men with college educa-
tions and that for all other workers the state sector rewarded schooling more
highly than the private sector.
Sorm and Terrell report that new firms, particularly in Estonia, pay less than
older state firms. Newell and Socha show a strong negative relationship
between wages and firm size in the private sector but not in the state sector.
This result does not speak directly to the newness of firms although age and
size are probably negatively correlated. That new private firms pay less than
older and larger state and private firms possibly contradicts the expectation that
wages will be higher in these new firms because their productivity will be
higher. There are two mitigating factors here. One is that over time, new firms’
wages rise proportionally with their productivity, size and success (Jackson
et al., 2005), approaching the levels of the older firms. Second, wages in the
short run will be affected by local labour markets, not just by productivity.
Workers in regions with high rates of destruction and/or low rates of creation
are likely to see smaller wage benefits from movement to the new, private firms
independent of productivity because of job competition.
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3. Propositions and data
There is still more to learn about transition processes and the dynamics of job
destruction, job creation and labour mobility. We merge two unique datasets – a
three-wave panel study of Polish workers from 1988 to 1998 and annual longitu-
dinal data on Polish firms from 1990 to 1997 – to address several specific ques-
tions related to job mobility and wage changes:
1. Did Polish workers experience periods out of the labour force and/or
unemployment as the formal models predict, as the firm-level data suggest
and as was observed in Estonia? Or, was there mostly job-to-job movement
as in the Czech Republic? Evidence on this point goes to the heart of the
question about whether job mobility is push or pull driven.
2. Do these non-workers and unemployed subsequently obtain jobs, thus
competing with those in the state sector who want to change jobs?
3. Is self-employment a realistic prospect for entrepreneurship?
4. Are wages negatively related to local job destruction because of the compe-
tition it creates between current workers and the not working and unem-
ployed, and positively related to regional job creation because of increased
demand for labour?
5. Are variations in human capital such as schooling, current job tenure and
being a manager related to job mobility and to wage differences between
the state and private sectors?
The individual data are the result of a longitudinal study of workers and
occupations begun in 1988 by the Polish Academy of Sciences (see Slomczynski,
2005). Selected respondents were re-interviewed in 1993 and again in 1998, with
an oversample of those who were self-employed and/or college graduates in
1988. (The data are described in Appendix A.) Each wave contains extensive data
on respondents – such as employment, by industry and ownership type, job ten-
ure, wages and occupation; individual characteristics such as education, age and
gender. Data on the number of new firms and gross job creation and destruction
in the respondent’s region are from Jackson et al.’s (2005) longitudinal firm data.
These data, described in Appendix A, measure employment, payroll and sales
annually between 1990 and 1997 for firms existing in 1990 with more than five
employees, identified by product code, ownership type, size and whether they
added or lost jobs. These data also identify and track the subsequent yearly sur-
vival, employment, payroll and sales of firms entering each year with more than
five employees, again identified by product code and ownership type. These data
are disaggregated by region so that they can be matched to respondents’ location
to create the information on the local labour market.3
3 There were 49 regions or voivodships in the period we analyse so that the job destruction and creation
data cover a relatively small area.
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The timing and the structure of the data are well suited to test the propo-
sitions discussed above. The 1988 wave provides detailed and accurate infor-
mation about workers’ situations and wages prior to the transition.4 The 1988
to 1993 interval corresponds to the period with the most job destruction
(unemployment peaked at 16.5 percent in 1993) providing evidence about who
left the state enterprises and what happened to them. The 1993 to 1998 inter-
val is a very successful transition period. De novo firm and job creation were
high, resulting in substantial aggregate growth and a sharp decline in unem-
ployment, to 10.2 percent. The timing then, corresponds to the formal models
in that massive job destruction preceded successful job creation. This corres-
pondence to the cycles in the transition makes 1988 to 1998 the appropriate
period for study even though the panel data extend beyond 1998. The inte-
grated panel and regional data enable us to examine better the full range of
propositions about the interactions among job mobility, income differences and
local labour conditions.
4. Descriptive summary
The first analysis describes the patterns of job retention and mobility during the
two transition periods. Although descriptive, these results begin to answer sev-
eral substantive questions. Of particular concern are the movements from 1988
jobs to new jobs and the proportion of moves that entailed a period of unemploy-
ment. A related question is whether these unemployed dropouts subsequently
take jobs, competing with current workers. Second, we can examine whether self-
employment is a main job or default option akin to unemployment. Following
Earle and Sakova (2000), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) and Slomczynski
and Osborn (2005) the self-employed are separated into two groups: ‘owners’
who employ other workers and ‘own workers’ who work only on their own
account. Unemployment is defined as not working but actively searching for a
job while not working and not searching is defined as not working. A worker in
a privatized firm is someone who said they worked for a private firm and that
the firm had been fully privatized.5 We excluded from all analyses the 169
respondents who classified themselves as not working, primarily associated with
retirement, in all three waves.
4 Other studies (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2002; Jurajda and Terrell, 2001, 2003) rely on post-1989
recall data to examine mobility, which may be faulty over a several year period and is limited in the
amount of information collected.
5 Workers in firms whose ownership structure had changed but which were not fully privatized are
classed as still working in the state sector.
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4.1 Job movement: 1988 to 1993
Table 1 shows the transition matrix for job movements between 1988 and 1993.
As expected, there is a significant increase in unemployment, which did not exist
in 1988, to 9.8 percent of the respondents, which corresponds to 12.3 percent of
the active 1993 workforce in the survey. An additional 14 percent of the state
workers in 1988 reported being out of the workforce in 1993. This means that
among state workers in 1988 but excluding retirees in 1993, a quarter were either
unemployed or out of the workforce in 1993. Even considering the hidden unem-
ployment in state firms, this is a substantial loss in production in a short period.
What is not shown in the table is that 6 percent of those working in 1988 and
1993 experienced at least one unemployment spell between 1988 and 1993, mean-
ing that a sixth of those working in 1988 were or had been unemployed during
the job destruction phase of the transition. Taking into account the 14 percent
who stopped working between 1988 and 1993 means that a third of state workers
in 1988 experienced some period of not working. This pattern fits the formal tran-
sition models that assume that job destruction precedes job creation, creating
under- and unemployment.
The possibly unanticipated result is that 16 percent of the small number
of private firm workers in 1988 were unemployed in 1993, and a fifth left the
Table 1. Employment transition probabilities, 1988–1993











Not work 0.363 0.147 0.194 0.064 0.048 0.143 0.170 353 +69
Pvt. farm 0.070 0.687 0.065 0.106 0.024 0.045 0.143 296 )4
Private 0.102 0.023 0.290 0.064 0.071 0.069 0.070 145 +114
Own work 0.039 0.013 0.032 0.340 0.310 0.029 0.041 85 +38
Owner 0.011 0.003 0.032 0.213 0.500 0.022 0.032 66 +24
State 0.218 0.013 0.194 0.128 0.000 0.547 0.399 826 )542
Privatized 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.016 34 +34
Unemp. 0.190 0.017 0.161 0.064 0.048 0.098 0.098 203 +203
Retire 0.000 0.097 0.032 0.021 0.000 0.024 0.031 64 +64
1988 Share 0.137 0.145 0.015 0.023 0.020 0.660 1.000
N 284 300 31 47 42 1368 2072
Creation 90 136 69 45 78 395
Destruction )94 )22 )31 )21 )620 )765
Notes: Entries are proportion of people employed in 1993 category given 1988 employment category. Bold
type indicates proportion staying in the same sector.
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workforce between 1988 and 1993. These numbers indicate substantial job
destruction in the private sector created within the planned economy. These pro-
portions are consistent with firm-level evidence that private firms, particularly
larger ones, experienced more job loss in percentage terms early in the transition
than did the state enterprises (Jackson et al., 1995, 2005). This outcome is not sur-
prising, as these large private firms were just as protected and subsidized as their
state-owned equivalents but were likely to be the first to be thrown under the
wheels of the capitalist reform train that eliminated subsidies.
As reported in previous studies, the de novo private sector created a significant
number of jobs, both for wageworkers and the self-employed. The large movement
to self-employment raises the question of whether this is simply a default option
for those without primary jobs. Clearly, the 66 owners do not fit the depiction of
self-employment as a secondary job and are clearly part of the job creation process.
One way to assess the quality of the own worker jobs is by hours worked, with
part-time work being associated with a lower quality job. If we define a part-time
job as less than 20 hours per week, 7 percent of men and 10 percent of women who
are own workers were part-time workers. These proportions contrast with 7 per-
cent of male and female private sector workers and less than 1 percent of the men
and 5 percent of the women in the state and privatized sectors. On the basis of
part-time work, own work differs little from wage employment.
Monthly income is a second way to assess job quality. If own work is an infe-
rior job, it should be reflected in substantially lower income, which incorporates
both wages and hours worked. The surprising result, depicted in Fig. 1, is that
Figure 1. Monthly 1993 income: by employment and gender
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own working men and women had higher mean and median job incomes than
men and women in the private and state sectors. Particularly interesting is the
gender wage gap, which is much smaller among the own workers than else-
where, and particularly compared with the private sector. We analyse wages and
incomes in more detail in a subsequent section, taking into account many factors
in addition to gender and sector. The important point here is that except for a
slightly higher proportion of part-time workers, there is little to support the prop-
osition that self-employment is a secondary job.
4.2 Job movement: 1993 to 1998
Table 2 shows the job movement for the second phase of the transition. As
expected, job destruction is down, particularly in the state sector, and job creation
is higher both in the private and privatized sectors. As predicted by the transition
models, about 30 percent of those unemployed or not working in 1993 found jobs
in private or privatized firms, including self-employment. This movement from
not working and unemployment provides significant competition for state work-
ers contemplating a move to the private sector.
Job destruction between 1993 and 1998 is concentrated in the state sector
where over 40 percent of the 1993 jobs were lost, and in agriculture where almost
60 percent of the workers left, most deciding to retire or to not work. Although
not large in terms of numbers, the job destruction rate in the private sector is
higher than that in the state sector. This suggests the maturing of this sector
where job turnover related to firm exits in a market economy might be quite high
over a 5-year period. (See Brown et al., 1990; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Jack-
son et al., 1999.) Jackson et al. (1999, 2005) show that the failure rate of new pri-
vate enterprises in Poland was higher than that in a comparable market economy
in the beginning of the transition but dropped substantially by the mid-1990s.
Notably, job destruction among the self-employed and owners is lower than in
either the state or private sectors.
Self-employment and ownership both increased between 1993 and 1998.
Among the own workers shown in Table 2 a fifth of the men and 37 percent of
the women are part-time workers. Among owners the proportions are 6 percent
and 10 percent, respectively. In the private sector part-time work increased to a
quarter of all workers. These are larger proportions than in 1993 and are larger
percentages than in the state sectors where about 5 percent of the workers work
part time. Despite the increase in part-time work a substantial number of the
own workers are full-time workers. It is also possible that with the improving
economy some of the part-time employment may be a family choice.6
The incomes of own workers relative to wage incomes are similar to what
was observed in 1993. Both men and women own workers on average make
6 Two-thirds of the self-employed women working part time report a spouse with a full-time job.
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more than workers of the same sex in private and state firms, although the medi-
ans for own work men and women are the same as in the state sector. (Workers
in privatized firms are included with state workers for this discussion.) A second
important observation about the own workers is that 19 percent of them in 1993
expanded their operations to be classed as owners in 1998 whereas 15 percent of
the owners became own workers. In terms of absolute numbers almost twice as
many own workers expanded to become owners, as there were owners who shed
workers to become own workers. These movements to and from ownership along
with the data on part-time work and income reinforce the earlier point that
among Poles, most self-employment appears to be a regular form of employment,
not a default or secondary option.
5. Statistical models
This section estimates models of the probability of individuals moving from one
sector to another for each time period and of the incomes associated with these







farm Private Own Own State Privtzd Unemp
1998
Share N
Not work 0.290 0.171 0.262 0.127 0.063 0.149 0.000 0.281 0.187 283
Pvt-farm 0.031 0.451 0.056 0.000 0.021 0.020 0.000 0.019 0.096 145
Private 0.073 0.039 0.383 0.016 0.063 0.020 0.000 0.100 0.069 98
Own work 0.031 0.027 0.094 0.476 0.146 0.033 0.046 0.044 0.055 90
Owner 0.016 0.012 0.000 0.191 0.563 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.036 54
State 0.093 0.016 0.103 0.064 0.042 0.580 0.000 0.106 0.291 441
Privatized 0.062 0.020 0.000 0.048 0.042 0.110 0.955 0.094 0.087 131
Unemp 0.057 0.043 0.028 0.048 0.021 0.041 0.000 0.244 0.063 95
Retire 0.347 0.222 0.075 0.032 0.042 0.039 0.000 0.094 0.117 177
1993 Share 0.127 0.170 0.071 0.042 0.032 0.439 0.015 0.106 1.000
N 193 257 107 63 48 664 22 160 1514
Net diff. +90 )112 )9 +27 +6 )223 +109 )17
Gross job creation and job destruction, no. jobs
Creation +29 +57 +60 +27 +56 +110 +339
Destruction )141 )66 )33 )21 )279 )1 )541
Notes: Entries are proportion of people employed in 1998 category given 1993 employment category. Bold
type indicates proportion staying in the same sector.
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job changes. The first is a multinomial logit model of the probability of a state
worker in 1988 staying in the state sector, moving to the private sector, becoming
self-employed, becoming unemployed or leaving the workforce.7 A second multi-
nomial logit model compares the probabilities of non-workers, unemployed and
state workers in 1993 being in the private sector, self-employed, unemployed or
not working relative to being in the state sector in 1998. These probabilities are
related to four measures of human capital, and to log of income at t ) 1, gender,
age and the amount of new firm creation and job destruction in the respondent’s
region. The human capital variables, from most to least general, are years of
schooling, a position as a manager, total work experience and tenure within the
current firm. The new firm variable for 1993 is the number of firms in 1990 with
fewer than 100 employees that survived to 1993 plus the number of yearly
entrants that survived to 1993 divided by the size of the 1993 workforce. Job
destruction is the gross job loss in large state enterprises between 1990 and 1993
as a proportion of their 1990 employment. For 1998 the new firm variable is the
net increase in new firms between 1993 and 1998 divided by the 1998 workforce.
Job destruction is the gross job loss in large state firms between 1993 and 1997
divided by their employment in 1993. All continuous variables are measured as
deviations about the sample means so the constant terms measure the expected
logit value for an average state worker in an average region. Instead of discuss-
ing the coefficients in the logit models we discuss the probabilities of job move-
ment predicted by these equations. The estimated job mobility equations and
related statistics corrected for clustering within regions are shown in Table B1.
5.1 Statistical model of employment mobility from 1988 to 1993
In modelling the probability of an average state worker remaining in the state
sector or moving to one of the other categories, we are particularly interested in
what proportion find another job versus what proportion leave the workforce or
experience unemployment. As the models predict and as seen in the descriptive
tables a substantial proportion of those leaving state employment were unem-
ployed or out of the workforce between 1988 and 1993. The top row in Table 3
shows the expected probability of an average state worker in 1988 being in one
of the 1993 job categories (or for any time between 1988 and 1993 in the case of
unemployment). These state workers have a 0.62 chance of keeping their job.
Those losing their job have a far higher probability of becoming unemployed
or dropping out, 0.26, than they do of finding a new private job or of being
7 State workers who retired or who became farmers are included in the ‘not working’ category as both
mean that the person effectively left the workforce. The unemployment variable for 1993 is defined as
one for any worker who is unemployed in 1993 or who is employed but experienced a spell of unemploy-
ment between 1988 and 1993. Own work and ownership are combined to make a single self-employment
category.
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self-employed, 0.13. Again these results suggest that in Poland the people who
lose a wage job are more likely to be unemployed or to leave the workforce than
they are to immediately get private sector jobs or to become self-employed.
The remaining entries in Table 3 show the differences in the probabilities of a
1988 state worker being in each 1993 sector associated with differences in the
individual and regional variables. The propositions about how variations in dif-
ferent forms of human capital affect mobility are generally borne out. Those with
more job tenure, the most specific form, are more likely to stay in the state sector
and less likely to be unemployed or in either of the private sectors. Supervisors
in state firms, a more general form of capital, were more likely to leave the state
sector for the private sector. Schooling, however, was associated with an
increased likelihood of staying in the state sector and as expected with a lower
probability of leaving the workforce or of being unemployed. These results sug-
gest that movement to the private sector may not be voluntary but forced by lay-
offs in state firms as presumably the better educated would be less likely to be
terminated involuntarily and thus to keep their state job. Finally, the regional rate
of de novo firm creation increases the probability that workers will be in the pri-
vate sector and decreases their likelihood of staying in the state sector or of being
Table 3. 1988–1993 Employment change from state employment in 1988
Job category in 1993
Statet Privatet Self-empt Unempt Not workt
Expected probability* 0.624 0.073 0.053 0.157 0.093
Difference from expected probability associated with difference in variable
% New firms† )0.018 0.030 0.009 )0.003 )0.018
% Lost jobs† )0.019 0.010 0.002 )0.001 0.009
1988 Tenure† 0.071 )0.025 )0.021 )0.031 0.006
1988 Experience† )0.017 0.031 )0.015 )0.013 0.015
1988 Supervisor‡ )0.069 0.061 )0.003 )0.014 0.024
1988 Income† )0.031 0.013 0.018 )0.009 0.008
1988 Age† )0.151 )0.019 0.009 0.003 0.158
1988 Age = 25‡ 0.011 )0.007 )0.028 0.075 0.011
1988 School† 0.099 )0.015 0.004 )0.050 )0.038
Female‡ 0.011 )0.022 )0.015 )0.013 0.039
Notes: *Expected probability of state worker in 1988 working in 1993 sector with all variables at their
means, Female = 0, Age > 30 and non-supervisor.
†Probability difference associated with a one sample deviation increase in %New Firms, % job loss, ten-
ure, experience, age, school or income.
‡Probability differences for persons with average characteristics but who had a supervisory rather than a
non-supervisory job in 1988; or who was 25 in 1988; or was a female rather than a male.
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out of the workforce. Regional job destruction was not statistically associated
with job changes although it is associated with small increases in the likelihood
the person leaves the state sector and gets a private job.
The coefficients on the log of income indicate that the higher workers’ 1988
income the more likely they were to leave the state sector for the private sector
and for self-employment. These results contradict the idea that people are likely
to leave the state sector for higher paying jobs in the private sector. If this were
the case there should be a negative relationship between 1988 income and leaving
the state sector. We will elaborate this point when we examine the wage changes
associated with job changes. The positive association between 1988 income and
becoming self-employed reinforces the finding of Earle and Sakova (2000) that
those with greater financial means were more likely to start businesses. They
relate this phenomenon to the role played by access to capital, the primary source
of which is one’s own income.
5.2 Statistical model of employment mobility from 1993 to 1998
The second model compares the probabilities of state workers and non-workers
and the unemployed in 1993 remaining in those categories or moving to the pri-
vate sector or to self-employment by 1998. In this model we are interested in the
probability of state workers moving to the de novo private sector, including self-
employment, or being unemployed or not working. We then want to know the
mobility of those unemployed or not working in 1993 as the higher the probabil-
ity of these individuals getting private sector jobs the greater the competition pre-
sented to state workers wanting to relocate. Table 4 shows the probabilities of
different mobility patterns between 1993 and 1998. (The unemployed and those
out of the workforce are combined in Table 4, as the coefficients for these two
groups in Table B2 are not statistically different.)8
The rows labelled ‘Expected Probability’ in Table 4 show the probability of
average state workers or non-workers in 1993 being in each employment category
in 1998. The relevant contrast is the probability of a state worker leaving that sec-
tor and getting a private job or not working compared with the probability of a
non-worker remaining a non-worker or getting a job. This comparison indicates
the amount of competition between members of these two groups for jobs in the
new private sector. Conditional on leaving the state sector, a state worker has an
expected probability of 0.37 of getting a private sector job. The unconditional
probability that a non-worker or unemployed person gets a private sector job is
0.29. Thus, for respondents with average characteristics, those leaving the state
sector have only a slightly higher probability of getting a private sector job than
a comparable unemployed or non-working person. The implication here is that
8 The chi-squared test for the equality of the coefficients is 5.51 with four degrees of freedom, which has
a P-value of 0.24.
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early job destruction creates a group of unemployed and non-working individu-
als who then compete for jobs as they are created in the private sector. A conse-
quence of this competition will be continued unemployment and a downward
pressure on wages.
The remaining entries in Table 4 show the differences in probable 1998
employment associated with differences in individual characteristics and regional
Table 4. 1993–1998 Employment change probabilities
State emp. 1993 Job category in 1998
Statet Privatet Self-empt Unempt Not workt
Expected probability* 0.665 0.125 0.059 0.025 0.126
Difference from expected probability associated with difference in variable
% New firms† )0.001 0.037 0.011 )0.005 )0.041
% Lost jobs† )0.004 )0.003 0.014 )0.005 )0.001
1993 Tenure† )0.027 0.012 0.003 )0.005 0.015
1993 Experience† )0.029 )0.021 )0.016 )0.003 0.065
1993 Supervisor‡ )0.133 0.090 )0.026 0.001 0.068
1993 Income‡ 0.014 )0.014 0.016 )0.007 )0.009
1993 Age† )0.176 )0.028 0.003 )0.005 0.206
1993 Age = 25‡ 0.101 0.012 )0.018 0.002 )0.097
1993 School† 0.070 )0.022 0.028 )0.013 )0.063
Female‡ 0.046 )0.048 )0.025 0.008 0.019
Not work/unemp 1993
Expected probability§ 0.162 0.291 0.091 0.114 0.342
Difference from expected probability associated with difference in variable
% New firms† 0.005 0.099 0.019 )0.019 )0.104
% Lost jobs† 0.001 )0.003 0.022 )0.021 0.001
1988 Experience† )0.021 )0.072 )0.031 )0.006 0.130
1993 Age† )0.079 )0.133 )0.025 )0.051 0.288
1993 Age = 25‡ 0.080 0.121 )0.010 0.047 )0.239
1993 School† 0.068 0.018 0.080 )0.046 )0.120
Female‡ 0.020 )0.103 )0.035 0.046 0.071
Notes: *Expected probability of state worker in 1993 working in 1998 sector with all variables at their
means, Female = 0, Age > 30 & non-supervisor.
†Probability difference associated with a one sample deviation increase in %New Firms, % job loss, ten-
ure, experience, age, school or income.
‡Probability differences for person with average characteristics but who had a supervisory rather than a
non-supervisory job in 1993; or who was 25 in 1993; or was a female rather than a male.
§Expected probability of non-worker or unemployed in 1993 working in 1998 sector with all variables at
their means, Female = 0, Age > 30 and non-supervisor.
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firm creation and job destruction for those in the state sector and either not work-
ing or unemployed in 1993. Higher rates of de novo firm creation are associated
with more employment in the private sector and fewer non-workers, but with lit-
tle change in state sector employment. A probable explanation is that without the
jobs these new private firms create more state workers would be not working
and more non-workers would remain not working. It does not appear that an
expanding de novo sector attracts state workers who might otherwise keep their
state sector job. Between 1993 and 1998 there is little association between job
destruction and job mobility, possibly because there was less job destruction dur-
ing these years than earlier in the transition.
Among those in the state sector in 1993, workers with more schooling, who
are under 30 and who are female are more likely to remain in the state sector
than state sector workers with average schooling and age or who are male. As
between 1988 and 1993 supervisors in 1993 are more likely than non-supervisors
to leave the state sector for the private sector. Among those unemployed or not
working in 1993, schooling is associated with increased employment in all catego-
ries and particularly with self-employment. Being under 30 is associated with get-
ting a private sector job. Women, relative to men, are more likely to become
unemployed or not work and less likely to take a private sector job. The results
suggest that men, those with more schooling and younger workers, offer the
most competition for the new private jobs. Incomes in 1993 are not associated
with job changes, again suggesting that the opportunity for higher wages may
not be motivating job change even during the job creation phase of the Polish
transition.
5.3 Incomes
The analysis of incomes during the transition addresses three questions. One is
whether people moving from the state sector to the private sector have higher
incomes. If workers move to the private sector for higher wages these movers
should have higher incomes than similar individuals who stay in the state sector.
If movement is forced by job destruction in the state sector then we would not
expect an income gain from such a move. Furthermore, if job destruction is creat-
ing unemployment it should have a depressing effect on private sector wages
unless there is a large amount of job creation in new firms. Finally, individual attri-
butes, such as schooling, job tenure and experience will be valued differently in a
market economy, permitting some workers to compete better for jobs in the new
sector, which will produce increased income differences related to these attributes.
The panel data provide an excellent test of propositions about how income
differences are associated with job changes since we can compare incomes for
those keeping and switching jobs as well as control for individual and local fac-
tors. Our analytical strategy is to relate the log of income at time t to a set
of individual and regional explanatory variables for people currently in the
518 Jackson and Mach
 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation  2009 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
workforce and reporting a salary. Income is monthly income from the main job
in 1998 złotys. Using the log of income means that difficulties in estimating the
inflation rate correctly, which is surely the case between 1988 and 1993, only
affects the constant term and not the coefficients, which assess differences in rela-
tive incomes. The equation estimated is,
logðInctÞ ¼ B0 þ B1SOEothrt1 þ B2SOEothrt þ B3Pvtt1 þ B4Pvtt þ B5Selft1
þ B6Selft þ B7Ownt1 þ ðB8 þ B9SizeÞ Ownt þ B10Pvtzdt1
þ B11Pvtzdt þ B12NotWorkt1 þ B13Unempt1 þ B14Farmt1 þ XAþ u:
The constant B0 is the expected income for someone employed in the state manu-
facturing sector at both time t and t ) 1. The other coefficients indicate how
incomes differ for those employed in a different sector at t ) 1 and/or t. Thus,
workers moving from the state manufacturing sector to the private sector are
expected to have a log of income at time t of B0 + B4. A significant positive value
for B4 suggests that movers are being attracted to the private sector by higher
wages whereas a zero or negative value suggests that workers are being pushed to
the new private sector by job reductions. The variable ‘SOEothr’ refers to workers
in the non-manufacturing state sector so that B1 and B2 assess the relative wages of
non-manufacturing state employees. ‘Size’ is the log of the number of workers an
owner employs. The coefficients B7 and B8 assess how incomes for own workers
and owners with one employee differ from incomes of wageworkers in the state
manufacturing sector. A comparison of these coefficients with B4 indicates how the
incomes of these self-employed individuals differ from those of wageworkers in
the private sector. The variables denoted by X represent a set of individual and
regional characteristics expected to be related to incomes. They are measured as
deviations from the means for each employment category so the B values compare
the incomes of average workers in each employment category. Farmers are omitted
from these models because their incomes proved hard to assess in real terms.
There are several different propositions about the expected wage differences
for workers moving between the state and private sectors. In theory, the de novo
private firms are more efficient and productive than the state firms, which in the
long run means that wages in the private sector should be higher if wages reach
their marginal product in each set of firms. (For evidence on the higher productiv-
ity of de novo firms, see DeLoecker and Konings, 2005 and Jackson et al., 2005.)
This, of course, assumes that the state firms face hard budget constraints and that
their wages are not subsidized. The reality is that state firms did not face perfectly
hard budget constraints and governments, particularly those elected with support
from workers in the subsidized sector, find ways to maintain wage and employ-
ment subsidies.9 The softer the budget constraints, the higher the state sector
9 Clearly this proposition is not unique to the so-called ‘transition political economies’.
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wages. The wage differences associated with harder versus softer budget con-
straints are likely to be particularly evident in the Polish panel data. The reform
government in office until 1993 made a point of hardening budget constraints and
enacted an excess wage tax on state firms. Private and privatized firms were
exempt from this tax. The post-Communist parties that took control after the 1993
election campaigned on a promise to end this tax and to be more sensitive to the
‘needs’ of the state sector firms and their workers. Newell and Socha (1998) note
that state sector wages increased relative to private sector wages between 1992
and 1996 and attribute this to increased demand without mentioning the political
explanation. For this analysis state workers are separated by whether they work
in mining, manufacturing or construction, or in other state enterprises.
The proposition about employment in the private sector having higher pro-
ductivity and thus higher wages is a long-term effect, however. At the firm level
there is substantial evidence that in the beginning new firms pay less than more
established firms but that among the surviving, growing firms wages rise faster
than among average firms, catching up to wages in the older firms. (See Jackson
et al., 2005; Jackson, 1994; Sorm and Terrell, 1999; and Jackson and Lu, 2004, for
evidence on wage growth in new firms in Poland, Estonia and Michigan, respec-
tively.) In an economy dominated by very young firms, such as Poland’s in the
transition, wages in the new private sector may be lower than elsewhere as these
new firms get established.
The vector X contains variables measuring local labour market and individual
characteristics,
XA ¼ ðA1Educþ A2Supert1 þ A3Expert1 þ A4Tenuret1Þ  Pvtt
þ ðA5Educþ A6Supert1 þ A7Expert1 þ A8Tenuret1Þ  Statet
þ A9Educ  Selft þ A10 logðhoursÞ þ A11JCþ A12JD
þ A13Femaleþ A14Age  50:
The evidence from the job mobility analysis indicates that the unemployed
and non-workers compete for de novo jobs, exerting downward pressure on
wages in the new sector regardless of the productivity differences. This implies
that the coefficient on job creation, JC, in the income equation should be positive
whereas that on job destruction, JD, should be negative. Regional job creation
between 1988 and 1993 is measured by the 1993 employment in firms with less
than 100 employees in 1990 plus the employment in firms existing in 1993 that
started after 1990 denominated by the size of the regional workforce in 1993. For
1993 to 1997 it is the growth in the employment in these firms between 1993 and
1997 plus the 1997 employment in new firms started between 1993 and 1997 as a
share of the workforce. De novo job creation rather than firm creation is used
here, as it is a better measure of labour demand. Job destruction is the same vari-
able used in the mobility analysis.
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The third set of propositions relate to changes in how firms value human cap-
ital. These propositions are that wage differences related to education and possi-
bly to having been a supervisor will be higher in the private than in the state
sector, that is, A1 > A5 and possibly A2 > A6. Education is measured by years of
schooling. Conversely, work experience and job tenure will be more highly
valued in the state sector, implying that A7 > A3 and A8 > A4. We also include
variables for age £ 50 and gender, as these factors are routinely associated with
wage discrimination in all sectors.
The estimated coefficients and standard errors corrected for the clustering
within regional districts for the income equations are shown in Table 5. The first
column shows the income equation for 1988, which establishes a baseline for sub-
sequent comparisons. Private sector workers have slightly lower but not statisti-
cally different incomes than state manufacturing workers in 1988. Workers in
non-manufacturing state jobs earn less whereas both groups of self-employed
earn more than state manufacturing workers. An owner employing one worker
earns slightly more than an own worker and the owner’s income increases with
the number employed. There is virtually no return to schooling in the private
and self-employed sectors. There are higher and statistically different returns to
schooling in the state sector. State worker incomes increase significantly with
additional job tenure and experience and are higher among supervisors. Women
and workers aged ‡ 50 have substantially lower incomes than younger and male
workers.
During the 1988 to 1993 transition job-to-job movements are not associated
with significant income differences except for becoming an owner.10 State manu-
facturing workers in 1988 are expected to have essentially the same income in
1993 regardless of where they are employed in 1993, unless they became an
owner. The F-test for whether the coefficients on 1993 employment other than
ownership are zero is 1.02, which has a P-value of 0.41, meaning that we are very
unlikely to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. The results for 1998 show
that those who were able to remain in the state manufacturing sector had signifi-
cantly higher incomes than wageworkers in the private, the privatized and the
non-manufacturing state sector. This result is consistent with Newell and Socha’s
(1998) finding although we suggest it is a probable consequence of the post-
Communist government that came into office in 1993 fulfilling its campaign
pledge to relax wage controls on state manufacturing firms. It is also consistent
with the findings in Jackson et al. (2005) who show with enterprise data that
between 1993 and 1997 payroll per worker in state firms increased faster than in
private firms and faster than either sales or productivity growth. The incomes of
own workers matched those of the state manufacturing workers whereas the
incomes of owners with one employee exceeded those of state manufacturing
10 The variable unemployed in 1988 refers to those who experienced an unemployment spell between
1988 and 1993. There was no official unemployment in 1988.
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Table 5. Income equations*
1988 1993 1998
Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err
log(hours)† 0.240 0.054 0.444 0.089 0.253 0.054
Self · School† 0.020 0.032 0.034 0.029 0.055 0.030
Pvt · School† 0.011 0.017 0.116 0.018 0.120 0.025
State · School† 0.048 0.003 0.085 0.006 0.067 0.007
Pvtt · Tenure†t)1 0.010 0.015 0.124 0.095
State · Tenure†t)1 0.044 0.012 0.017 0.009 0.094 0.029
Pvtt · Exper†t)1 0.025 0.044 )0.043 0.076
Statet · Exper†t)1 0.077 0.011 0.041 0.021 )0.002 0.045
Pvtt · Supert)1 0.069 0.169 )0.017 0.111
Statet · Supert)1 0.090 0.031 0.082 0.047 0.233 0.070
Own work0 0.264 0.091 )0.002 0.152 0.019 0.175
Own work1 0.090 0.110 0.062 0.126
Owner0 0.310 0.113 )0.158 0.149 0.123 0.141
Owner1 0.445 0.141 0.275 0.139
log(owner size) 0.237 0.152 0.351 0.109 0.516 0.083
Private0 )0.086 0.085 )0.092 0.129 0.111 0.107
Private1 )0.084 0.070 )0.309 0.104
Privatized0 )0.131 0.104
Privatized1 0.090 0.091 )0.043 0.080
State – Other0 )0.115 0.037 0.083 0.036 0.181 0.094
State – Other1 )0.025 0.049 )0.307 0.095
Farm0 0.304 0.235 )0.329 0.168
Not work0 )0.088 0.080 )0.288 0.091
Unemployed0 )0.118 0.073 )0.041 0.109
D % New jobs† 3.134 0.377 2.122 0.479
%D State ) Large† )0.287 0.129 )0.1425 0.231
Female )0.290 0.020 )0.301 0.037 )0.264 0.042
Age ‡ 50 )0.182 0.034 )0.175 0.055 )0.144 0.065
Constant‡ )1.238 0.054 1.187 0.057 0.144 0.068
R2 0.39 0.43 0.50
N 1411 1122 745
Notes: *Equation for log(Income) in year t, given characteristics in year t ) 1 and jobs in year t and t ) 1,
except 1988 where there is no t ) 1 information.
†Variable set to the mean value for that occupation category, e.g. private worker.
‡Expected log(Income) for an average male state manufacturing worker at time t ) 1 and t.
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workers and then increased substantially as the number of employees grew. The
results in Table 5 strongly suggest that workers were not moving from the state
to the private sector for higher wages.
The propositions that local job creation and destruction affect wages are
supported, although weakly, in one instance. Respondents in regions with
higher rates of de novo job creation had significantly higher incomes in both
1993 and 1998. A one standard deviation increase in de novo job creation is
associated with a 9.7 percent higher income in 1993 and a 10.3 percent higher
income in 1998. A one standard deviation increase in job loss among large
state enterprises is associated with a 2.8 percent lower income in 1993 and a
1.1 percent lower income in 1998 although the 1998 coefficient is not statisti-
cally significant. The coefficients on de novo job creation and large-scale job
destruction indicate that local labour market conditions have important impacts
on incomes.
Finally, there are mixed results for the propositions about the income differ-
ences associated with various aspects of human capital. Returns to schooling
were higher for those in the private sector than in the state sector by 0.031 in
1993 and by 0.053 in 1998. A standard deviation difference in schooling is associ-
ated with about a 9 percent higher income in 1993 and about a 10 percent higher
income in 1998 in the private relative to the state sector. The coefficients on job
tenure and total work experience are not statistically different in the two sectors
and only tenure is consistently related to higher incomes. Supervisors moving to
the private sector, contrary to expectations, had incomes comparable with super-
visors staying in the state sector in 1993 and lower incomes in 1998. Women and
workers aged ‡ 50 consistently have lower incomes even after controlling for
such factors as hours worked and schooling. We included interaction variables
for self-employed women and although the coefficients were positive they were
relatively small and statistically insignificant.
The income equations provide important evidence about job mobility in
addition to estimates of the returns to human capital and of the effects of the
local labour market. There is no evidence that those moving to private firms
did so because they received higher incomes. In fact, between 1993 and 1998
those remaining in state manufacturing or privatized enterprises had higher
incomes than those who moved. The estimates of the returns to education and
to having been a supervisor in a state firm reinforce this conclusion. The
coefficients on schooling suggest that private sector jobs probably offered
higher returns to additional schooling, which might have encouraged those
with more education to change jobs. The results of the analysis of job change
in Tables 3 and 4 show just the opposite. The probability of leaving the state
sector for a private firm decreased with schooling, which is opposite to that
found for supervisors, who had higher incomes if they stayed in the state sec-
tor, but the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 is that supervisors were more likely
than non-supervisors to move to private firms in both periods. These analyses
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clearly suggest that job mobility, at least in Poland during the 1990s, was
push rather than pull driven.
6. Conclusions
These panel data present a detailed view of the transition from a state-domi-
nated to a market economy that closely parallels the conventional economic
transition models. Individual transitions from the state sector to the private
sector are the dominant job change, other than exits from the labour force.
Substantial job destruction preceded job creation, which was done by de novo
enterprises rather than privatized state firms. Furthermore, a significant pro-
portion of this movement over the 1988 to 1998 period involved a period of
unemployment or exit from the labour force before obtaining a private sector
job.
These results are consistent with the Estonian transition (Haltiwanger and
Vodopivec, 2002) but in stark contrast with that in the Czech Republic (Jurajda
and Terrell, 2001, 2003; Sorm and Terrell, 1999). Terrell and colleagues report
sectoral restructuring, but with most employment changes being job-to-job moves
without periods of unemployment. When the Czech economy began its decline
after 1996 they find more movement into unemployment, consistent with the
Polish data. These Polish–Czech differences up to 1996 are very likely a result of
the difference in the rate at which the state enterprises were closed or restruc-
tured, as distinct from being privatized.
The Polish transition and the results of our analysis of this transition highlight
an important feature of some transition models. The rapid and early job destruc-
tion in the state sector, when it precedes job creation as in Poland and Estonia,
creates a high level of under- and unemployment as many workers experience
spells of joblessness. Both the theoretical models and our empirical results show
that this puts downward pressure on local wages, which are only raised as the
de novo sector expands. In some of the theoretical models (Burda, 1993; Jackson,
2003; Tichit, 2006) this unemployment contributes directly to the success of the
new private sector and thus to the success of the transition. Burda (1993, p. 102)
says, ‘Unemployment is not merely a by-product: it is necessary for the transfor-
mation’. Our evidence is that former state workers are likely to experience a spell
of joblessness and those under- and unemployed workers compete for jobs in the
new private sector. That incomes are then negatively related to job destruction
and positively to job creation is completely consistent with these models and the
labour market models on which the propositions are based. Overall, these results
lend considerable support to the traditional economics of transition models, with
additional detail about individual and regional attributes that facilitate these
movements.
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The lessons from the Polish transition as seen in these results go beyond sup-
port for these traditional models of transition. They indicate that self-employment
is an integral part of the de novo sector and in many cases own account workers
become owners employing other workers. The own workers are only slightly
more likely to be part-time and their incomes match or exceed those of wage-
workers in the private and public sectors. Finally, the evidence that job mobility
is more likely push rather than pull driven implies that for the Schumpeterian
model to work in any economy there must be stringent constraints placed on
outmoded sectors and firms that force the reallocation of resources, human and
physical, to the de novo sector. Simply relying on higher incomes in the new
enterprises may not be sufficient for this transfer.
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Jackson, J. E., Klich, J. and Poznańska, K. (2005). The Political Economy of Poland’s Transi-
tions, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Appendix A: Data sources
Polish social structure and social mobility panel study
The Polish Panel is composed of selected respondents from a 1988 study of
5854 men and women aged 21–65. A randomly selected sample of these
respondents plus an oversample of self-employed and college graduates in the
1988 sample were re-interviewed in 1993, 1998 and again in 2003. Table A1
shows the sample sizes for each of the first three waves of the panel study
used in this paper and the respective oversamples. The most important feature
is the fact that 2268 of the 1993 interviews and 1775 of the 1998 interviews
were with respondents who had been interviewed in 1988, providing the lon-
gitudinal information that spans the beginning of the transformation in 1989.
Twenty-seven 1993 respondents and twenty-nine 1998 respondents were
dropped because the 1993/1998 data strongly suggested they might not be the
targeted 1988/1993 persons or the data did not match the 1988/1993 data. For
details of this study, see Slomczynski (2005).
Table A1. Polish social structure and social mobility panel
1988 1993 1998
N – Original sample 5854 2102 1648
N – Oversample from original (entrepreneur + college) 166 127
N – Total 2268 1775
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Longitudinal firm data: 1990–1997
The firm data on job creation and job destruction are based on a dataset pre-
pared jointly with the Research Center for Economic and Statistical Studies of
the Polish Central Statistical Office. These data constitute a longitudinal file on
the year end employment, payroll and sales of firms with more than five
employees existing in Poland at any point between 1990 and 1997. These longi-
tudinal data are based on information firms are required to report to the Cen-
tral Statistical Office on an annual basis. The firm data are linked to provide a
history of each firm’s employment, payroll and sales. The firms are stratified by
size, region, product code, and ownership type – state, private or foreign-
owned. These data allow us to count the number of growing and declining
firms and the number of failed firms over this period, and the jobs, wages and
sales gained or lost by these firms in various categories. The data also count
the number of entering firms each year. The data on entrants indicate their sur-
vival, employment, payroll and sales in each succeeding year, again stratified
by region, product code and ownership type. Consequently, it is possible in
any year to estimate the gross job creation in firms entering since 1990 and sur-
viving to that year. It is also possible to estimate the gross job creation of these
firms and of entering firms in any subsequent period, such as 1993 to 1997.
Table A2 shows the numbers of firms and employment in several categories in
1990 and 1997. For a full description and assessment of these data, see Jackson
et al. (2005; Appendix A).
Table A2. Numbers of firms and employment, longitudinal database
1990 1997
Firms Employment Firms Employment
State* 18,409 7003.8 16,350 3454.9
Large private† 803 212.2 294 55.9
Small private 14,365 259.2 4375 165.3
New: 1991–1997‡ 89,663 2311.1
Totals 33,577 7475.2 110,682 5987.2
Notes: *Includes state-owned, cooperatives and firms privatized by 1997.
†Large private equals firms in 1990 with more than 100 employees.
‡Firms existing in 1997 that entered after 1990.
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Appendix B
Table B1. Multinomial logit for 1988 to 1993 employment*





Variable Coeff St. Err. Coeff St. Err. Coeff St. Err. Coeff St. Err. Sig.†
Tenure0‡ )0.599 0.155 )0.658 0.199 )0.360 0.129 )0.053 0.091
Experience0‡ 0.364 0.265 )0.303 0.309 )0.058 0.193 0.166 0.151 0.22
Supervise0 0.724 0.254 0.069 0.412 0.024 0.267 0.351 0.189 0.04
Log(Income0)‡ 0.551 0.292 0.877 0.358 )0.012 0.211 0.352 0.380 0.04
Schooling‡ )0.126 0.055 )0.024 0.051 )0.177 0.034 )0.228 0.027
Female )0.373 0.250 )0.356 0.319 )0.107 0.181 0.333 0.197 0.17
Age/10‡ )0.032 0.258 0.432 0.330 0.292 0.197 1.273 0.208
Age < 30 )0.061 0.310 )0.025 0.397 0.912 0.223 2.105 0.317
New firms‡,§ 0.477 0.112 0.228 0.141 0.014 0.114 )0.239 0.135
% Lrg loss‡,– 1.619 1.083 0.660 1.441 0.222 0.866 1.195 0.866 0.44
Constant )2.149 0.176 )2.456 0.253 )1.376 0.135 )1.906 0.169
N 1368
Notes: *Log odds of moving to specific employment group relative to staying in the state sector.
†Wald test for statistical significance of variable. No entry indicates statistically significant at less than the
0.001 level.
‡Variable computed as deviation from sample mean.
§Number of small firms in 1990 plus firms entering from 1991 to 1993 divided by size of workforce in
voivodship.
–Job destruction in large state firms between 1990 and 1993 divided by large enterprise employment in
1990 in voivodship.
Table B2. Multinomial logit for 1993 to 1998 employment*





Variable Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Sig.†
State0 )1.672 0.189 )2.414 0.333 )3.289 0.393 )1.648 0.211
Unemployed0 0.551 0.308 )0.669 0.319 )0.251 0.318 0.635 0.277
Not work0 0.683 0.391 )0.346 0.515 )0.791 0.523 1.005 0.419
Tenure0‡ 0.144 0.164 0.108 0.256 )0.124 0.205 0.180 0.127 0.45
Experience0‡ )0.122 0.213 )0.236 0.286 0.073 0.287 0.408 0.201 0.03
Supervise0 0.765 0.274 )0.358 0.478 0.253 0.652 0.658 0.335 0.06
Log(Income0)‡ )0.330 0.344 0.524 0.454 )0.880 0.570 )0.239 0.328 0.43
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Table B2. (cont) Multinomial logit for 1993 to 1998 employment*





Variable Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Sig.†
Educ0‡ )0.096 0.033 0.094 0.054 )0.285 0.058 )0.260 0.042
Female )0.561 0.253 )0.631 0.264 0.264 0.289 0.055 0.213 0.02
Age0/10‡ 0.050 0.225 0.318 0.367 0.176 0.290 1.225 0.205
Age0 < 30 0.043 0.303 0.089 0.534 0.182 0.454 0.656 0.288 0.21
New firms‡,§ 0.129 0.040 0.079 0.073 )0.108 0.077 )0.192 0.049
% Lrg loss‡,– )0.228 0.959 2.566 1.699 )2.411 1.591 )0.222 0.932 0.29
N 1059
Notes: *Log odds of moving to specific employment group relative to being in the state sector, given that
the respondent was in the state sector or was not working in 1993.
†Wald test for statistical significance of variable. No entry indicates statistically significant at less than the
0.001 level.
‡Variable computed as deviation from sample mean.
§Number of firms entering from 1993 to 1997 divided by size of workforce in voivodship.
–Job destruction in large state firms between 1993 and 1997 divided by large enterprise employment in
1993 in voivodship.
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